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INTRODUCTION

Why do community groups and individuals oppose establishment of intensive
scale livestock operations in communities? Why have established forms of economic
activity become the pariah of rural communities across the nation? In December
1997, the Pennsylvania Senate passed Resolution 91.1 This article addresses the
results of a research project funded by the state Department of Agriculture in response
to Senate Resolution 91, directing the Secretary of Agriculture to develop a model of
community dispute resolution to address community conflicts involving intensive
livestock operations ("ILOs").2 Specifically this article addresses project findings
detailing why conflicts over ILOs arise and how they escalate.
1.
See Senate Resolution Calls for Study of Livestock Operations, PA-DEP UPDATE
(Pennsylvania
Department
of
Environmental
Protection),
Dec.
12,
1997,
at
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/polycomn/update/12-12-97/12129715.htm (last modified Dec.
12, 1997).
2.
See Senate Resolution Calls for Study of Livestock Operations, PA-DEP UPDATE
(Pennsylvania
Department
of
Environmental
Protection),
Dec.
12,
1997,
at
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/polycomm/update/l 2-12-97/12129715.htm (last modified Dec.
12, 1997).
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I.

PROJECT OVERVIEW

This project sought to understand the origins of conflicts over ILOs,
stakeholder perspectives about these conflicts and to recommend a model for
community participation in the resolution of these conflicts To begin this work, the
project team undertook three distinct activities. First, it investigated the existing legal
context surrounding the siting and operation of intensive livestock operations in
Pennsylvania. This included not only understanding the provisions of the Nutrient
Management Act4 and the Protection of Agricultural Operations form Nuisance Suits
and Ordinances,' but also the "Right to Farm Law," as well as local zoning, nuisance
and tort actions that could apply to ILO siting or operation. During the course of this
research project, the Pennsylvania Legislature amended the Municipalities Planning
Code.' Second, using a qualitative research design, the project team conducted
interviews with a variety of stakeholder groups whose perspectives on these conflicts
differed considerably. Analysis of the data was to gain an understanding of the factors
that give rise to these conflicts from as many different points of view as possible. The
third activity was a review of relevant dispute resolution literature on conflicts similar
to those over ILOs.' The project team sought to determine what factors influenced the
3.
Specific project goals were set by the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture and
included:
A. Addressing the concerns of agriculture and of all society with regard to conflicts associated with
agricultural activities in Pennsylvania's rural communities.
B. Responding to the requirements of Senate Resolution 91 of 1997.
C. Establishing a framework of understanding that realizes community disputes must find solutions
that are both environmentally sound and economically feasible.
D. Establishing relationships that foster harmony between disparate populations in a community.
E. Evaluating the fundamental need to apply alternative strategies to resolve disputes involving
agricultural activities interacting with surrounding neighbors and communities.
F. Assessing the impact that alternative strategies have on the problems to which they were applied.
G. Assessing the current situation in rural Pennsylvania regarding the knowledge and interest of rural
farm and non-farm residents and organizations in alternative conflict resolution strategies, their
willingness to employ them, and the costs associated with employing them.
H. Assessing the operational needs and requirements to establish conflict resolution strategies for
disputes in the agricultural realm.
I. Developing a template, or "cookbook" as it came to be known, for use by the agricultural
community, local leaders, and other organizations, which can be used as an action plan to create and
operate this conflict resolution system in a specific community.
4.
See Nutrient Management Act, 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1701-1718 (West 1995).
5.
See Protection of Agricultural Operations From Nuisance Suit and Ordinances, 3 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 951-957 (West 1995).
6.
See Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1010111202 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001).
7.
See generally Laura L. Martin & Kelly D. Zering, Overview of Environmental Issues
Related to the Industrialization of Animal Agriculture, in INDUSTRIALIZED ANIMAL AGRICULTURE,
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND STRATEGIES FOR COLLABRATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING AND CONFLICT

RESOLUTION I (William M. Park ed., 1997); Daphne A. Kenyon, The Economics of NIMBYs 16 (1991)
(working paper, on file with author).
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selection of alternative dispute resolution processes in other "NIMBY" (not in my
backyard) cases and the existence of procedures for dealing specifically with
community conflicts over ILOs. By conducting these three activities, the project team
sought to answer the following research questions:
1. Why do these disputes arise in Pennsylvania?
2. What are the factors that influence people's perceptions of the issues and
the other parties?
3. What is the legal context within which these disputes arise?
4. How does this legal context affect prospects for resolution of disputes
over ILOs?
5. What can be done to constructively address these conflicts?
III. PROJECT METHODOLOGY

A.

Legal Research Methodology

Siting and operating an ILO is subject to a complex web of federal and state
statutes and regulations, as well as local ordinances. The principal laws that were
reviewed for this project include:
* Federal and State Constitutions
* The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Title 33 United States Code,
sections 1251 et seq.,' and regulations at 40 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1229
* The Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law, Title 35 Pennsylvania
Consolidated Statutes Annotated section 691.1 et seq.,"° and regulations at Title 25
Pennsylvania Code"
0 The Pennsylvania Nutrient Management Act, Title 3 Purdon's
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Annotated, sections 1701-1717,2 and regulations
3
at Title 25 Pennsylvania Code
* The Protection of Agricultural Operations from Nuisance Suits, as
amended, the Pennsylvania "Right to Farm Law," Title 3 Purdon's Pennsylvania
Consolidated Statutes Annotated, sections 951-957 "'

8.

See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 125 1, et seq. (1994).

9.

See EPA Administered Permit Programs: The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination

System, 40 C.F.R. pt. 122 (2001).

10.
II.

See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 691.1 (West 2001).
See 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 91.1-91.52, 92.1-92.79, 93.1-93.9z, 96.1-96.7, (West

2001).
12.
13.
14.
Pennsylvania

See Nutrient Management Act, 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1701-1717 (West 2001).
See 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 83.201-83.491.
See Protection of Agricultural Operations from Nuisance Suits, as amended the
Right to Farm Law, 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 951-957 (West 1995).
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* The Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, Title 53 Purdon's
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Annotated, sections 10101-1 1202 "
* The Agricultural Security Area Act, Title 3 Purdon's Pennsylvania
Consolidated Statutes Annotated, sections 901-91516
* The State Conservation Commission, as described in Title 3 Purdon's
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Annotated, section 852'"
* County Conservation Districts, as described in Title 3 Purdon's
Consolidated Statutes Annotated, sections 853 through 864's
* The Environmental Hearing Board Act, Title 35 Purdon's Consolidated
Statutes Annotated, sections 7511-7514'9
In addition to statutes and regulations, the project team reviewed federal and
state case law interpreting the statutes or regulations considered, as well as those
describing and defining common law tort concepts of nuisance, negligence and
trespass.20 In analyzing these statutes and regulations, the focus was on applying the
laws and regulations in the ILO context and identifying opportunities for use of public
participation processes. Two situational settings were considered for this analysis:
(1) when an intensive livestock operation is proposed for an area and (2) when an
intensive livestock operation is operating and in place. The following questions were
involved in analyzing the respective settings:
If an ILO is proposed:
1. What federal, state and local government controls apply?
2. Under what circumstances will these controls apply?
3. What are the procedures for the application of these government controls?
4. What opportunities for public input are built into these procedures?
5. Where are opportunities for expanded use of public participation
processes?
6. Under what circumstances will parties have recourse to the courts?
If an ILO is operating:
1. What federal, state or local government controls apply?
2. How are they enforced?
3. What are the procedures for enforcement?

15.
See Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1010111202 (West 1997 & Supp.).
See Agricultural Security Area Act, 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 901-915 (West 2001).
16.
See State Conservation Commission, 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 852 (West 2001).
17.
See County Conservation Districts, 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 853-864 (West 2001).
18.
See Environmental Hearing Board Act, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7511-7514 (West
19.
2001).
See PROSSER AND KEATON, THE LAW OF TORTS, §§ 13, 30, 86-01 (5th ed. 1984).
20.
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What opportunities for public input are and could be built into these
procedures?
5. Under what circumstances will parties have recourse to the courts?
6. What opportunities for alternative dispute resolution are built into this
procedure?
7. Where are opportunities for expanded use of alternative dispute
resolution?
From this analysis a series of flowcharts was developed to visualize the identified
procedures and the relationships between various statutes, regulations and ordinances.
4.

B.

i.

InterviewMethodology

Data Collection

To answer the research questions, the project team conducted in depth
interviews with thirty individuals who represented stakeholder groups that were
actively involved in conflicts over ILOs in Pennsylvania. The stakeholder groups
included and the number of interviewees in each group are listed in Table 1.

Stakeholder Type

Number of Interviews

Government
Farm Interests
Community and Environmental Interests
Other Interests

10
9
8
3

Table 1

ii. Interview Protocol
Project personnel used a structured interview format that covered a wide
range of topics. The broad areas covered in the interviews included: (1) the
interviewees' perceptions about the issues in the dispute; (2) their perceptions of the
parties involved and their relationships with them; (3) their perceptions of their own
interest group; (4) their experience in resolving the dispute; (5) their preferences for
future dispute resolution processes; and (6) their views about third party roles and
characteristics.
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iii. Interview Data Analysis
Once the interviews were transcribed, the data was analyzed in several
different steps following standard open coding techniques." The first step in this
approach involved searching the interview transcripts for important ideas that were
raised by several interviewees. The project team identified several themes that
appeared frequently in the interview transcripts. These themes represent aspects of
ILO conflicts that the respondents repeatedly told us were important. To qualify as a
theme, the topic had to appear in several interviews, create an organizing structure for
the analysis, and subsume smaller details within it. The following themes emerged as
important ones: Issues and interests of the parties, identity issues, polarization points,
trust/mistrust, perceptions of risk, conflicting agency roles, power/politics,
legal/legislative issues, contextual (site specific) issues, negative characterization of
other parties, choice points in the siting process, characteristics of successful conflict
resolution processes, and key characteristics of third parties
Second, building on these themes, the project team used grounded theory
methodology to develop a model of how conflict develops and escalates in ILO
disputes.22 The project team searched the data for relationships among the important
themes. The themes were then organized into an overall model or theory that reflect
these relationships. As the model emerged, it was continually checked against the
data to ensure its validity.
This article reports on three key topics, which are reported in a separate subsection. The first topic, "Context," provides the results of an analysis of the economic
and legal issues that affect the conflict. The second topic, "Issues in ILO Conflicts,"
identifies the key issues about which stakeholders expressed concerns. To give
readers an idea of how widely issues varied between stakeholders, the article will refer
to comments from the interviews to give voice to stakeholder concerns. The third
topic, "An Anatomy of Conflicts Over Intensive Livestock Operations," provides an
analysis of the social dynamics that occur in conflicts over ILOs. It presents a
detailed model of how these conflicts arise.

21.
See generally ANSELM STRAUSS & JULIET CORBIN, BASICS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH:
GROUND THEORY PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES 61-74 (1990) (discussing open coding techniques).
22.
See generally BARNEY G. GLASER & ANSELM L. STRAUSS, THE DISCOVERY OF GROUNDED
THEORY: STRATEGIES FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 1-6, 237-250 (1967) (discussing the meaning and
methodology of grounded theory); see, e.g., STRAUSS & CORBIN, supra note 19, at 24-32 (discussing

grounded theories origin and methodology).
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IV. CONTEXT

A.

The Agricultural Context

From a national perspective, consolidation in confined feeding operations
increased from the 1970s to the mid-1990s for the poultry and livestock industries.'
Along with these trends came relative production shifts among regions in beef and
feedlot cattle, dairy, swine, and broiler production.24 Geographical shifts were
especially pronounced in the hog industry.25 The Corn Belt states lost production, and
non-traditional states, such as North Carolina, increased their relative share of
production over this period.26
Changes in animal agriculture have created third party effects for society at
large. Water quality degradation is an example of such impact." A national review
completed in 1995 found non-point source pollution from agriculture to be a major
source of water quality impairment.2" In states that reported detailed assessments,
animal waste runoff from feedlots and rangeland was found to be an important cause
of impaired water quality. 9
The cornerstone of existing national policy for addressing water quality
problems from animal agriculture is the Federal Clean Water Act of 1972.30 The
United States Environmental Protection Agency has been in charge of issuing
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System Permits ("NPDES") through the
states for concentrated animal feeding operations ("CAFOs"), which are "generally
those farms with greater than 1000 animal unit equivalents."'" As of 1995, about 2000
of the estimated 6600 CAFOs in the United States had permits. 2 Water quality
impairment and concerns about the effectiveness of NPDES program implementation
have led to states' development of their own approaches and for new national level
strategies to be proposed and/or implemented.33

See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ANIMAL AGRICULTURE: INFORMATION ON WASTE
23.
MANAGEMENT AND WATER QUALITY ISSUES 2 (1995) [hereinafter U.S. GAO].

24.
See id.
25.
See Martin & Zering, supra note 7, at 6-8.
26.
See id.
27.
See David E. Ervin & Katherine R. Smith, Agricultural Industrialization and
EnvironmentalQuality, CHOICES, 4th Q. 1994, at 7.
28.
See U.S. GAO, supra note 23, at 8.
29.
See id.at 11.
30.
See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2001).
See The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 40 C.F.R. pt. 122.23 (2001);
31.
see also U.S. GAO, supra note 23.
32.
See U.S. GAO, supra note 23.
See Karen M. Wardzinski, et al., NationalPollutantDischargeEliminationSystem Permit
33.
Application and Issuance Procedures,in THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK 58, 75 (Parthenia B. Evans
ed., 1994).
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Among the unintended effects of the consolidation occurring in the animal
sector are community controversies over ILOs. "' Two issues are at the root of these
controversies. First, concerns exist about the economic impact of intensive livestock
operations on competition within the industry." Small farmers, in particular, are
worried that they can no longer remain competitive as industry consolidation
intensifies.
Second, community disputes related to the siting and regulation of these ILO
facilities have been heating up in many states because of their potentially adverse
consequences on the environment." Examples of such conflicts have occurred in
North Carolina, where manure lagoon spills in 1995 caused severe environmental
problems." This led to tightening of state-level regulation, more local control, a
moratorium on certain new or expanded hog operations 8 and steps to phase out
lagoons. 9 Additional environmental damage in North Carolina caused by flooding
from Hurricane Floyd in 1999 elevated the level of an already contentious debate."
Land use disputes involving ILOs and neighbors have become lengthy, contentious,
and expensive for all of the parties involved."' Such disputes have also occurred in
other states with significant livestock and poultry production operations, including
Pennsylvania.4
Animal agriculture plays an important role in the national and Pennsylvania
economies. This sector is undergoing significant and rapid change and faces many
challenges. Technological and marketing innovations have generated rapid changes
within the industry. In general, animals (poultry and livestock) can now be produced

34.
See Charles W. Abdalla, Consequences of Animal Agriculture: Emerging Issues Related
to Federal,State and Local Control (July 1997), reprinted in INDUSTRIALIZED ANIMAL AGRICULTURE,
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
RESOLUTION,
at
19,

AND STRATEGIES FOR COLLABORATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING AND CONFLICT

26

(William

M.

Park,

ed.,

1997),

available

at

http://www.ext.msstate.edu/srdc/publications/208.pdf (last visited April 13, 2002).
35.
See D.L. Bartlett & J.B. Steele, The Empire of the Pigs, TIME, 52 (Nov. 30, 1998); J.E.
Ikerd, Sustainable Agriculture: An Alternative Model for Future Pork Producers, Prepared for NE-165

Research Conference on Vertical Coordination in the Food System (June 5-6, 1995) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
36.

See M. C. Hallberg, et al., Performance in Animal Agriculture: A Frameworkfor Multi-

DisciplinaryAnalysis, College Station, TX: Texas A&M Univ. Center for Biotechnology, Policy and
Ethics, Discussion Paper No. 96-8 (September 1996).

37.

See Martin & Zering, supra note 7, at 5, 11.

38.

39.

See id.
See S. Marberry, North CarolinaAdopts Lagoon Phaseout, FEEDSTUFFS, July 3 1, 2000, at

40.

See C. W. Schmidt, Lessonsfrom the Flood: Will Floyd Change Livestock Farming? 108

1-3.
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP.

41.

A74, A77 (2000).

See D. DeKok, Neighbors Fight Possible Hazards of Large Feedlots, SUNDAY PATRIOT

NEws, Nov. 22, 1998, at D-I; Ikerd, supra note 35.
42.
See C.W. Abdalla & J.D. Shaffer, Politics and Markets in the Articulation of Preferences
for Attributes of Rapidly Changing Food and Agricultural Sectors: Framing the Issues, 9 J. AGRIC.&
APPLIED ECON. 57, 61-62, 65-67 (1997).
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on larger and fewer farms. 3 Increasingly, key production decisions are being shifted
to the agribusiness level as contracting and other coordination mechanisms are being
utilized."
Pennsylvania has the second largest agriculture sector in the Northeast and
Middle-Atlantic regions (following North Carolina) and its agricultural economy
relies heavily on animal production.45 The Commonwealth has a human population
second in size only to New York in this region.' Much recent population growth in
the state has occurred in counties with significant agricultural production."'
Pennsylvania is strengthening its position relative to several neighboring states in
most species of animal production."' Pennsylvania also is located within a region
where public support for protecting water resources, including the Chesapeake Bay
and its tributaries, has been increasing. 9 Continuation of such trends suggests that the
state will face challenges in balancing the goals of animal production, environmental
protection, and quality of life in rural areas.
Much of the debate about animal agriculture in the latter half of the 1990s in
both the United States and in Pennsylvania has centered on swine operations.
Pennsylvania has a significant swine industry. Nationwide, it ranked 14 d in 1987 and
111 in 1997." Over time the state's swine sector has been able to solidify its position
within a broader region where the industry is declining in most states.1
Commentators have observed a trend toward geographic concentration in
swine production in the United States from the 1970s to the mid-1990s. 52 In
Pennsylvania, commentators noted that geographic concentration in swine production
has occurred in several southeastern and south central counties, including Lancaster
and Lebanon counties and concluded that these counties represented potential "hot

43.
See Charles W. Abdalla, et al., What We Know About Historical Trends in Firm Location
Decisions and Regional Shifts: Policy Issuesfor an IndustrializingAnimal Agriculture Sector, 77 AM. J.
AGRic. ECON. 1229, 1229 (1995).
44.
See id. at 1230.
45.
See id. at 1229-1236.
46.
See Charles W. Abdalla, Proceedings of the Conference on Managing Nutrients and
Pathogens from Animal Agriculture, the Natural Resource, Agriculture and Engineering Service (2000)
(on file with author).
47.
See C.W. Abdalla & T.W. Kelsey, Breakingthe Impasse: Helping Communities cope with

Changeat the Rural-UrbanInterface, 51

J.OF SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION

462, 463 (1996).

48.
See Abdalla et al., supra note 43, at 1229.
49.
See Abdalla, supra note 34, at 19, 23.
50.
See Shengun Wang, A Comprehensive Analysis of Determinants of the Swine Industry's
Expansion in Pennsylvania (unpublished Master's thesis, Pennsylvania State University) (on file with
author).
51.
See Charles W. Abdalla, Proceedings of the Conference on Managing Nutrients and
Pathogens from Animal Agriculture, the Natural Resource, Agriculture and Engineering Service (2000)
(on file with author).
52.
See generally B. J.Hubbell & R.Welsh, An Examination of Trends in Geographic
Concentration in US. Hog Production, 30 J.AGRIc. & APPLIED ECON. 285 (1998) (discussing the
geographic concentration of hog production in the United States).

2002]

Community Conflicts Over Intensive Livestock Operations

spots" of public concern over environmental issues." In the last ten years, growth in
the state's swine production occurred in other areas, including south central
Pennsylvania and the northern tier counties of the state. 4 Residents in these areas are
less accustomed to this scale and intensity of agriculture.
As livestock operations grew in size and located in areas with little previous
intensive livestock operations, community residents and environmental groups began
to voice objections. 5 Several local townships passed ordinances that sought various
ways to prevent ILOs from locating in the township or to impose significant
conditions upon their operations. 6 Producer interests faced regulatory action at the
local level that could reflect widely different approaches and restrictions in each
community. Responding to this situation, the Pennsylvania legislature passed the
Nutrient Management Act and declared it to be a legislative measure of statewide
concern that occupied the whole field of regulation regarding nutrient management.57
The Act specifically excluded local regulations deemed to be inconsistent with or
more stringent than the requirements of the Nutrient Management Act and regulations
adopted to implement it.58
The Nutrient Management Act restrictions on local authority angered some
residents and added fuel to controversies that erupted when some intensive livestock
operations proposed to locate within communities.59 This interface between state

53.
See id. at 295.
54.
See Shengun Wang, A Comprehensive Analysis of Determinants of the Swine Industry's
Expansion in Pennsylvania (unpublished Master's thesis, Pennsylvania State University) (on file with
author).
55.
See Charles W. Abdalla, A Changing Animal Agriculture: Implicationsfor Economies
and Communities in the Middle Atlantic States, Proceedingsof the Conference on Managing Nutrients
and Pathogensfrom Animal Agriculture, NATURAL RESOURCE, AGRICULTURE AND ENGINEERING SERVICE
("NRAES") Ithaca, NY: Comell University (2000) at 130.
56.
See e.g., JUNIATA COUNTY ANIMAL WASTE STORAGE AND NUTRIENT MANAGEMENT
ORDINANCE, No. 1-1990 (1990).
57.
See 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1717 (West 1995). This section provides:
This act and its provisions are of Statewide concern and occupy the whole field of
regulation regarding nutrient management to the exclusion of all local regulations.
Upon adoption of the regulations authorized by section 4 no ordinance or regulation
of any political subdivision or home rule municipality may prohibit or in any way
regulate practices related to the storage, handling or land application of animal
manure or nutrients or to the construction, location or operation of facilities used for
storage of animal manure or nutrients or practices otherwise regulated by this act if
the municipal ordinance or regulation is in conflict with this act and the regulations
promulgated thereunder. Nothing in this act shall prevent a political subdivision or
home rule municipality from adopting and enforcing ordinances or regulations which
are consistent with and no more stringent than the requirements of this act and the
regulations promulgated under this act, provided, however, that no penalty shall be
assessed under any such local ordinance or regulation for any violation for which a
penalty has been assessed under this act. Id.
58.
See id.
59.
See generally Jacqueline P. Hand, Right-to-Farm Laws: Breaking New Ground in the
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legislative action that impacts on local authority is also seen in recent land use and
growth management measures passed in June 2000 that became effective on August
22, 2000.1 One of the purposes of the 2000 amendments is to ensure that local
municipalities enact zoning ordinances that facilitate the present and future economic
viability of existing agricultural operations and not prevent or impede an owner or
operator's need to change or expand an operation in order to remain economically
viable.6' These new provisions will play a key role in future community land use
planning.
In regard to community comprehensive plans, communities are now directed
to include in their plan measures for the protection of prime agricultural land in the
community which is consistent with and does not exceed the requirements of the
state's Agricultural District law,6' its Protection of Agricultural Operations from
Nuisance Suits and Ordinances law,63 and its Nutrient Management Act.6' In regard to
the Nutrient Management Act, the plan must be consistent with the act's requirements
regardless of whether any agricultural operation within the area affected by the plan
meet the act's definition of a concentrated animal operation.6 5
It should also be noted that both nationally and in Pennsylvania, the public
and regulators have focused their attention on hog operations. However, there is
potential for the attention to encompass poultry and dairy operations as the issues of
phosphorus, air quality, or other issues are explored and public policies and programs
developed.
B.

The Legal Context

Legal requirements for ILOs are affected by any or all of the following:
0 The police power authority of local government expressed in general and
specific municipal law to address matters affecting public health, safety and welfare
through local ordinances such as zoning, subdivision and land development, building
permit and environmental safety and control ordinances;

Preservationof Farmland,45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 289, 297 (1984) (stating "those individuals who choose to
continue farming often become involved in unpleasant conflicts with their non-farming neighbors over
the activities necessary to continue their operations").
60.
See 2000 Pa. Laws 67, 68 (amending various sections of the Municipal Planning Code, 53
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 10101-12200 (West 1995 & Supp. 2001)).
61.
See 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10105 (West 1995 & Supp. 2001).
62.
See 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 901-915 (West 1995 & Supp. 2001).
63.
See 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 951-957 (West 1995 & Supp. 2001).
64.
See 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1701-1718 (West 1995).
65.
See generally 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1706(a) (West 1995) (providing that a
concentrated animal operation is one where the animal density is greater than two animal equivalent units
per acre of land on an annualized basis. An animal equivalent unit is considered to be one thousand
pounds of live weight of livestock or poultry animals, regardless of the number of animals).
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* State enabling laws, such as the Municipalities Planning Code, that
authorizes local communities to enact land use planning measures and controls.
* State laws that address activities affecting water quality, such as the
Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law and the Nutrient Management Act.
* State laws that protect agricultural operations from nuisance suits,
commonly known as "Right to Farm" Laws.
* State laws, such as the Agricultural Security Act, whose purpose is to
create agricultural security areas, or districts, which provide for conservation and
protection of development of agricultural lands, State laws that establish the State
Conservation Commission and County Conservation Districts and define their
jurisdiction and procedures.
* State laws that establish the Environmental Hearing Board and grant it
decision-making authority over environmental issues.
* Federal laws that address activities that affect water quality, such as the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly known as the Clean Water Act
* Federal and State Constitutional provisions establishing substantive and
procedural due process, the authority of federal and state governments and the
relationships between state and local governments.
* State court decisions interpreting common law concepts of nuisance,
negligence and trespass, as well as defenses to such causes of action.
The application of these laws to ILOs depends very much upon situation-specific
factors, including:
* The area and physical characteristics of the land on which the facility will
be located.
* The numbers and types of animals that will be raised at the facility.
* The livestock management process adopted by the facility.
* The facility's decisions regarding manure management, including the
need for construction of new facilities or reliance on existing facilities.
The following overview, however, is designed to permit a general understanding of
the legal context affecting disputes over ILOs.
i.

Local Ordinances

Pennsylvania municipalities (e.g., townships, cities, and boroughs) have
primary authority to plan for the use of land.' Generally, community authority is
exercised through the promulgation of local land use controls.67 Such controls
include: building permit ordinances, subdivision ordinances, land development
ordinances, environmental control ordinances and zoning ordinances. 68 These land
66.
67.
68.

See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 10501, 10601 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001).
See id. § 10603.
See id. § 10603.
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use controls are created to achieve some general objectives, such as to protect public
health, safety and morals, and provide for the general welfare.69 In addition,
municipalities are also authorized to achieve a series of specific objectives. 0 These
objectives, include such things as promoting conservation of energy, use of renewable
energy resources, preservation of natural and historic resources, encouraging
preservation of prime farmland and ensuring that municipalities enact zoning
ordinances that facilitate the present and future economic viability of existing
agricultural operations and do not prevent or impede the owner or operator's need to
change or expand their operations in the future to remain viable.7
The nature of these local land use controls varies. For example, a township's
building ordinance may simply require that the ILO owner apply and pay for a permit
and provide limited information about an activity. However, other ordinances may
impose more extensive conditions or requirements. For example, an environmental
control ordinance may require the ILO to fully describe what it proposes to do and
how it will do it, require that the facility do certain things or describe the steps it will
take to prevent harm to the community, and require approval of a permit before
operation may begin.
The 2000 amendments to the Municipalities Planning Code will undoubtedly
impact on local government authority to establish conditions that affect existing
farming operations. While the impact is clear, this article will not address the nature
of them, as they were not in place at the time this research was conducted. While
stakeholder comments refer to issues that will be affected by the amendments, it
would be unreasonable to speculate how stakeholder views would be affected by the
amendments.7 2 Discussion of the impact of these changes remains available for
another day.
ii.

State Statutes and Regulations

Two Pennsylvania statutes are particularly relevant to understanding the
controversial nature of disputes over [LOs.
These statutes are the Nutrient
Management Act ("NMA") 73 and the Protection of Agricultural Operations From
Nuisance Suits law, commonly known as the "Right to Farm" Law ("RFL").74 Both
of these statutes impact on local community authority to regulate ILOs in whatever
75
way communities see fit.
69.
See id. § 10603.
70.
See id. § 10603.
71.
See 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10105 (West 1995 & Supp. 2001).
72.
For a detailed discussion of the impact of these amendments, refer to John C. Becker,
PromotingAgriculturalDevelopment Through Land Use PlanningLimits, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. L.
J. (forthcoming 2002).
73.
See Nutrient Management Act, 3 PA. CONS. STAT. AN. §§ 1701-1717 (West 2001).
74.
See 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § §951, et seq. (West 2001).
75.
See 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 951, 953-54, 1702, 1717.
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The Pennsylvania Legislature created the NMA to protect water quality
through abatement of nonpoint source pollution activities. 6 More specifically, the
NMA protects water quality in Pennsylvania by requiring certain ILOs that generate
or use animal manure to develop nutrient management plans." The plans are prepared
by certified specialists and reviewed and approved by either the State Conservation
Commission or the responsible county conservation district before the ILO can begin
operation.78 ILOs must operate in a manner consistent with their approved plans or
face sanctions. Importantly, however, not all ILOs are required to prepare and receive
approval of nutrient management plans. 9 The NMA applies only to those ILOs that
are defined as Concentrated Animal Operations ("CAO"s)." CAOs are farms that
have more than two animal units for each acre of land on which animal manure is
being applied."' This definition, which is tied directly to the question of which
facilities are covered, implies a decision that those facilities that are subject to the Act
pose the greatest threat of pollution and are thereby subject to the Act's requirements.
The Act further provides that local governments do not have authority to pass
regulations or ordinances that are inconsistent with or more stringent than the
requirements of the Nutrient Management Act.82 Indeed, when townships passed
ordinances that imposed higher fines and required greater setback areas than those
contained in the NMA, the ordinance was successfully challenged in court as being
inconsistent with the NMA." This provision is known as a "pre-emption" provision
as its purpose is to limit the ability of local government to address a problem that
would ordinarily be within its level of authority." Pre-emption is an established
mechanism for accomplishing policy goals such as regulatory consistency,
predictability and economy. Nonetheless, as will be demonstrated in the Finding
section of this article, the pre-emption provision in the NMA has resulted in confusion
and dissatisfaction for some stakeholder groups.
The Pennsylvania Legislature passed the Protection of Agricultural
Operations From Nuisance Suits law in 1982.85 This law, like many others in states
across the country, came to be commonly known as the "Right to Farm" law. 6
However, the operation of the law cannot be accurately described as one that grants
someone a right to continue an activity absolutely. At best, such laws grant certain

76.
See id. §§ 1701,et seq.
77.
See id. § 1702(1).
78.
See id. §§ 1706(d), (e).
79.
See id. §§ 1706(a), (b).
80.
See id. § 1706(a).
81.
See id. § 1706(a).
82.
See id. § 1717.
83.
See McClellan et al. v. Granville Township Bd. of Supervisors, Bradford County Ct. C.P.,
No. 99EQ0000 16 (decided April 6, 2000).
84.
3 PA. CONS. STAT ANN. § 1717 (West 2001).
85.
See 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 951-57 (West 1995).
86.
See Hand, supra note 59, at 297-98.
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protections if described conditions or requirements are met. Most states have adopted
7
such laws, and their form varies across the country.
The Pennsylvania RFL was created to conserve, protect and encourage the
development and improvement of agricultural land for production of food and other
agricultural products." Its purpose is to slow the loss of agricultural resources. 9 If a
farm meets the RFL's definition of a "normal agricultural operation," complies with
federal, state, and local requirements and does not directly harm public health, safety
or welfare, local governments cannot consider that farm a nuisance when public
nuisance laws are passed.' In addition, the Act can be a defense to a farm owner sued
by a private citizen for a nuisance claim against him or her if the agricultural operator
has lawfully been in operation for one year or more prior to the date that the nuisance
complaint is filed and the conditions or circumstances complained of are normal
agricultural operations and have existed substantially unchanged since they were
established. 9'
iii.

FederalStatutes and Regulations

Certain 1IOs also need to meet the requirements of the federal Clean Water
Act ("CWA") and its regulations.9 The discharge of a pollutant from a point source,
which is a defined and identifiable place, into a water source is a violation of the
CWA if the facility has not complied with the Act's terms and conditions. 3
"[A]gricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture" are
not considered to be discharges from a point source."
To comply with the CWA, persons whose businesses discharge pollutants
must obtain permits.95 These permits impose operating conditions upon the business
in order to minimize harm to the water system.9
As with the NMA, not all ILOs are covered by the CWA. The CWA applies
only to those ILOs that are defined as concentrated animal feeding operations
("CAFOs"). 97 A concentrated animal operation under Pennsylvania's NMA is not
necessarily also a CAFO under the CWA. To be a CAFO, an ILO must be an "animal
feeding operation" '8 and must have either: (1) at least 1,000 animal units confined at
87.
88.

See id. at 298-99.
See 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

89.
90.

See id. §951.
See id. § 953.

§ 951 (West 1995 & Supp. 2001).

91.
See id. § 954.
92.
See 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (1994).
93.
See id. § 1362(14).
94.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1994).
95.
See id. § 1342(a)(1).
96.
See id.§ 1342(a)(5).
97.
See id. § 1362(14) (defining a point source and includes within it the term "concentrated
animal feeding operation").
98.
EPA Administered Permit Programs: The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
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the facility; (2) between 301 and 1,000 animal units confined and either discharge
pollutants through man-made systems or directly into the water source; (3) less than
301 animal units confined and, after an inspection, be found to discharge pollutants
through man-made systems or directly into the water source."
Only those ILOs that come within the definition of a CAFO are required to
obtain CWA permits. These permits are granted and enforced by the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection. Generally, in order to obtain these permits,
CAFOs must submit the following:
* A nutrient management plan (see NMA supra note 73 and accompanying
text)
* An animal manure storage facility permit
* An erosion and sedimentation control plan
* An individual National Pollution Discharge Elimination System storm
water discharge permit'"
This overview of the legal context highlights the following difficulties in the statutory
and regulatory context affecting ILOs that was generally applicable at the time the
research was conducted:
0 Local governments' authority to protect public health, safety and welfare
in the community is limited by the NMA and the RFL.' °' The exact extent of this
limitation is not clear since interpretation of the limitations have been few. For
example, if the NMA is considered to be a water quality law, does it have any impact
on other types of environmental problems, such as air quality or odor? Do local
governments retain authority to limit operations that threaten air quality, rather than
water quality? Can local governments regulate those ILOs that are not regulated by
the NMA?
* Although both the NMA and the CWA are intended to protect water
quality, neither statute applies to all LOs.' 2 The NMA and the CWA may apply to
different ILOs, due to the differences in the definitions of a CAO and a CAFO. As
will be seen in the Findings, this inconsistency has caused confusion for many
stakeholders.
* In many parts of Pennsylvania, county conservation districts bear
substantial responsibility for the implementation of the NMA.'°3 In addition, they play
a role in the CWA permitting process. As will be seen in the Findings, there is

System, 40 C.F.R. pt. 122.23(b)(1) (2001) (defining Animal Feeding Operation).
99.
See id. § 122.23(c); see also id. pt. 122, App. B.
100.
See 25 PA. CODE § 92.5a (2001).
101.
See 3 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 953, 1717 (West 2001).
102.
See id. § 951 et seq.; 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 etseq. (West 2001).
103.
See Pamela S. Clarke & Stacey M. Cronk, The Pennsylvania Nutrient Management Act:
Pennsylvania Helps to "Save the Bay" Through Nonpoint Source Pollution Management, 6 VILL ENVTL
L.J. 319, 332-333 (1995); see also 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 17.04(8) (1993).
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confusion about the allocation of regulatory responsibility among agencies, and some
stakeholders are concerned that the conservation districts may not be fully equipped
for their current regulatory roles.
V. FINDINGS

A.

Issues in Intensive Livestock Operations Conflicts

Stakeholders in disputes over ILOs in Pennsylvania have many different
interests. Some groups worry about health and safety, for both humans and the
environment. Others want to continue to be able to make a living as farmers. Still
others want to have a globally competitive agricultural program. All of the
stakeholders have an interest in how decisions are made and in who makes them.
However, they often disagree about the "right way" to make the decision.
Some of the stakeholder groups also have common interests and common
values. These common interests include the desire for an economically viable
community, a high quality of life, and a safe place to live and raise children.
Stakeholders' interests are summarized in Figure 1.

The Role of

Economic Impact

Figure 1

Decision Making Processes

Community Conflicts About
Farming and Our
Food Supply
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B.

i.

Pennsylvania Viewpoints

Pennsylvania Stakeholders'Interests

This section describes stakeholder views on these issues. The interview
comments selected are not exhaustive, but they were chosen to illustrate the concerns
and perspectives of Pennsylvanians interviewed as part of this study.
ii.

Environmental Use

citizens, environmental advocacy groups, public
Many stakeholders:
agencies, and the agricultural community, discussed the importance of taking care of
the environment. Agribusiness decision-makers, farm leaders, and small farmers see
themselves as stewards of the environment. They believe they are siting, operating,
and regulating intensive livestock operations in a way that will protect the
environment. One interviewee referred to a national pork producers program to
Another emphasized DEP's role in environmental
demonstrate stewardship.
protection within the commonwealth. Still another espoused the coexistence of
environmental protection and farming.
Many community groups see themselves as environmental stewards, and do
not believe current regulations adequately protect the environment from the effects of
intensive livestock operations. Meanwhile, some farmers are concerned current
regulations go too far. These farmers believe family farms are unlikely to harm the
environment, and they fear the cost of complying with regulations could drive family
farms out of existence.
iii.

Health and Safety

The interviews revealed that community members living near an existing or
proposed ILOs, and representatives from environmental groups are concerned about
health and safety issues. These stakeholders worry about the spread of diseases and
illnesses potentially related to odors.
iv.

The Role of Government Officials

Concerns about health, safety, and the environmental impact of intensive
livestock operations appear to be compounded by dissatisfaction with the government
officials responsible for regulating land use by intensive livestock operations. In
many communities, there is an obvious lack of trust in government officials. Three
specific perceptions contribute to this lack of trust:
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First, there is a perception of lack of clarity in current laws about which
agencies have authority to make decisions, how to reconcile inconsistencies among
different agency regulations, and just how much authority particular regulatory
agencies really have. Second, some stakeholders do not trust government officials
because the stakeholders perceive government officials lack the expertise or resources
needed to make and enforce good decisions. Third, citizens express great concern
about perceived conflicts of interests or bias at both local and state levels. Some
groups perceive some local and state officials are acting as advocates and supporters
of intensive livestock operations when their job should be to act as advocates for all
citizens.
Other groups think local government officials are bowing to community
concerns even when farmers have satisfactorily completed all of the tasks required by
existing local regulations. They do not believe this is fair.
v.

Economic Impact

Citizens, farmers, and agribusiness stakeholders share a concern about the
economic health of local communities. These stakeholder groups differ on their
perceptions of the economic impact of intensive livestock operations for local
communities. Some people believe these operations will improve the economic
situation of the communities in which they are built. Others argue they are
detrimental to the local economy.
vi.

Community Conflicts About Farmingand Our Food Supply

Economic concerns like those raised above are often connected closely to
predictions about the future of farming and food production. Many in the agricultural
field feel the conflicts over intensive livestock operations often lead to polarization
between small and large farmers in discussions about the "right" way to farm. Some
believe intensive livestock farming is inevitable and necessary to compete in a global
economy. Others believe this type of farming is really an industry that does not
belong in agricultural communities. They do not believe intensive livestock
operations offer farmers long-term economic viability. Additionally, people feel a
tension between wanting to do what is right for the overall community, and not
wanting to do it at the expense of some members of the community, particularly small
farmers.
vii. Decision-makingProcesses About Intensive Livestock Operations
A fundamental concern of almost everyone involved in these conflicts is
participation in decision-making processes. Everyone feels it is important he or she
have a say in decisions that affect their community, their ability to use their land as
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they choose, and/or their right to have a safe living environment for their families.
People want to be treated with respect and to have their input taken seriously.
Some people are frustrated with the type of public decision-making processes
they are currently offered. They feel these processes often hinder the kind of
exchange of ideas, concerns, and information needed to make good choices. Of
course, stakeholders realize sometimes no compromise is possible because one or both
sides are not willing to listen or hear the other's point of view.
The interviews reveal that many stakeholders feel they do not have control
over decisions they think they should have. Environmentalists and citizens focus on
the local government's loss of control over decisions regarding land use by intensive
livestock operations. In contrast, the agribusiness and farming stakeholder groups
perceive that local government officials are intentionally exceeding their authority in a
way that inappropriately limits farmers' control.
C.

An Anatomy of Conflicts Over Intensive Livestock Operations

The description of the growth of ILOs in Pennsylvania, along with our
interview data, suggests a number of reasons why ILOs have become contentious
issues in Pennsylvania. This analysis of the social dynamics that contribute to the
development and escalation of conflicts over ILOs offers insight into the polarized
nature of these conflicts.
The analysis of these dynamics focuses on the inter-relationships between the
stimuli that get people involved in the conflict, their cognitive responses (perceptions,
feelings, interpretations, attributions, etc.), and the actions they choose to take in
response to their assessment of what is happening. Our model of the conflict dynamics
is comprised of four main steps (See Figure 1). In the first step (labeled A in Figure
1) a stimulus or precipitating action occurs. This may be the passage of a state level
law or local level ordinance, a proposal for siting a CAFO in a community, a change
in existing regulations, or an incidence of environmental damage (such as those in
North Carolina). Whatever action is taken is understood to take place against an
existing backdrop of history and already established relationships among the
stakeholders.
In step two, this stimulus triggers one of several critical cognitive or affective
reactions from concerned stakeholders (see B in Figure 1). These cognitive or
affective reactions include perceptions of uncertainty, risk, lack of fairness, threats to
one's identity, and mistrust. These cognitive or affective reactions play a key role in
the progression of conflicts over ILOs. For example, some stakeholders may perceive
the action as unfair. They may experience it as increasing or reducing the level of
certainty they feel about these issues. They may see the action as affirming or posing
a threat to their social identity (e.g., as a farmer or an environmentalist or as an
agribusiness person). The action may also increase or reduce the level of trust one
stakeholder group feels toward other stakeholders in the dispute. For these
stakeholders, the actions trigger a number of negative responses.

28
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In Step three (see C in Figure 1) these cognitive or affective reactions to the
stimulus lead an individual (or a group) to make a judgment about the degree to which
they can control the situation. Stakeholders whose cognitive or affective reactions are
negative (feel threatened, distrustful, etc.) are likely to feel they have little control
over their situation. They may perceive they cannot influence the development of an
ILO plan proposed by an ILO owner from outside their community. Still others may
believe environmental groups have had inordinate amounts of influence over how the
regulations stipulated in the Clean Water Act are enforced. Our data suggests that
perceptions of control associated with negative affective or cognitive responses are of
two main types: (1) some stakeholders express a sense that an inequality of power
exists with respect to ILO siting and regulation. That means some people believe they
cannot influence a particular situation as much as other stakeholders can; (2) others
believe they have no recourse. They feel silenced because they do not believe they
can influence the handling of how or where an ILO is sited. On the other hand,
stakeholders who perceive the initial stimulus as beneficial to them are likely to
experience an enhanced sense of control in the situation. For example, some farmers
believe the current legislation in Pennsylvania affords them considerable latitude to
farm as they choose.
Step four of the model (see D in Figure 2) suggests that parties assess their
reactions and make a judgment about their ability to exert control over the situation,
and, based on this assessment, make choices about how to behave in the conflict.
These assessments influence both the degree to which they become mobilized in the
conflict and the venue (e.g., process) they select as a viable way to pursue their goals.
For example, the less control they perceive they have, the more likely they will be to
engage in some form of conflict behavior in order to protect or restore their own sense
of well-being and control. On the other hand, stakeholders who perceive they have a
high degree of control are unlikely to feel any need to take protective actions that
might lead to conflict.

A

B

C

Stimuli-Actions
that are taken

Cognitive/
Affective reactions

Judgment about one's
Perceptions of Control

*
*
"
"
"

Figure 2

uncertainty
risk perception
fairness
identity threat
trust

D
Conflict Behavior
* Choice of Venue
o Degree of
Mobilization
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The overall model generally applies to all stakeholder groups. However,
because the model is quite complex, the article describes specific parts of the model in
a step-by-step fashion below. It also discusses how the model reflects differences
among stakeholder groups where appropriate. Initially this article will examine the
kind of stimuli that give rise to conflicts over ILOs. Then, the article will show how
each of the five cognitive/affection reactions described above can affect perceptions of
control and how these, in turn, generate conflict-inducing behaviors.
i.

Stimuli

The project data identifies a variety of stimuli that serve as entry points for
people in the conflict. These range along a continuum from direct to indirect stimuli.
Examples of direct impact situations include proposals to place an intensive livestock
operation somewhere in the community. Examples of indirect impact situations
include passage of a new law or a decision by an agency or a court that then results in
a response from the community based on its assessment of how such action will affect
the community's interest. The more direct the impact of an action, the more probable
it is the individual or group will respond.
A wide range of stimuli, such as the passage of a law, the adoption of a new
regulation or the application of new court or agency rules, can trigger conflicts over
ILO's. Responses to these stimuli take a variety of forms that we explore in the
following sections. Here, we briefly show how one stimulus, laws regulating CAFO
operations, trigger different reactions in different stakeholder groups.
Dissatisfaction with regulations is frequently based on disagreement with the
substantive terms of legislative or regulatory measures. For example, community
activists, environmentalists, and government officials all criticized the Nutrient
Management Act. The pre-emptive nature of this act has resulted in some community
members worrying about their perceived loss of control over livestock operations built
in their communities. Others worry about perceived inadequacies in the law, like its
initial failure to regulate manure exported from the CAFO to other farms. When these
concerns were voiced, exported manure was not subject to regulation under the
original guidelines established in this act. 104 Some government officials raise a
different concern about the act, suggesting it gives an advantage to owners and
104.
In January, 2000, after this study began and the interviews were conducted, the
Department of Environmental Protection adopted regulations (See 25 Pa. Code § 91.36(b)) to address the
concern raised by several of the people interviewed that a loophole existed in a regulatory program
designed to protect water quality. These regulations require landowners who apply manure to comply
with approved standards published by the agency in its publication, "Manure Management for
Environmental Protection." Alternatively, landowners that choose not to follow such guidelines can
comply with environmental protection obligations by obtaining a permit from the agency. Passage of the
additional measures and timing of the interviews did not allow for follow up questions to see how any of
the people interviewed would react to the new provisions.
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developers in that if non-compliance is suspected, the burden of proof lies with the
accuser, not with the developer. Some people express deep concerns about the
economic impact that compliance with environmental regulatory laws might have on
business.
VI.

PERCEPTIONS

In this section we consider each of the five cognitive/affective reactions (Box
B in Figure 2) and how they relate to perceptions of control (Box C in Figure 2).
A. Perceptionsof Uncertainty
One important result of the kinds of stimuli mentioned above is that they
produce change. Changes may include shifts in stakeholders' understanding of the
laws, how state agencies enforce those laws, or what is included in the specific plans
for a proposed ILO. When such changes occur, they often create uncertainty for those
affected. Our data show that all stakeholders react to uncertainty, but they experience
different kinds of uncertainty.
Regulations are a very important source of uncertainty for many stakeholders.
For some, the laws may specify precisely what they must do to comply (e.g., the
Nutrient Management Act requires operators to prepare a nutrient management plan).
For others, however, the law may present a confusing morass of information that
creates discomfort and uncertainty for them regarding what actions others will or will
not take. This confusion leads to an increase in dissatisfaction with the law and may
lead to a decreased sense of control. This is especially true when efforts to clarify the
confusion lead to inaction or to actions that others perceive as disregard for legal
mandates themselves.
Uncertainty was also expressed around issues of enforcement. Both farmers
and government officials talk about problems with enforcement. Some interviewees
note that part of the problem is that state agencies charged with implementing
regulations do not have enough information themselves to answer questions about
them. Another person sees the root of the problem with townships that are willing to
enact regulations that they know violate the Nutrient Management Act. This person
believes that even though the Nutrient Management Act is law in Pennsylvania,
authorities that should uphold it are willing to violate it.
In addition to concerns about enforcement, agricultural stakeholders
sometimes get upset because of the inadequacy of the law. Additionally, some CAFO
operators express concerns that community residents believe CAFOs are electing to
locate in certain communities that have lax regulations.
For community members, uncertainty focuses in three particular areas: preemption, health effects due to odors, and confusion over enforcement of regulations.
Pre-emption is one major source of uncertainty for local communities. Pre-emption
deals with a local community's authority to address an issue that has already been

2002]

Community Conflicts Over Intensive Livestock Operations

addressed at the state level. Substantive provisions of the Nutrient Management Act
have gained attention because they involve pre-emption of local authority to pass
ordinances that are more restrictive than the state provisions. While pre-emption may
be clear to some, for others it creates considerable confusion. Specifically, people
seem to be confused about what pre-emption is, why it was used in the Nutrient
Management Act and how it affects their local authority to deal with problems that
concern local residents.
There is also considerable confusion about the health effects of odors. A
government official expressed concern whether offensive odors will come from the
new facility. The official did not have accurate information to answer the question,
but he could speculate on the type of factors that would influence the ultimate answer
to the question.
For agribusiness, uncertainty occurs because the links among community
concerns and farm operations are not clear. From the perspective of one stakeholder,
community concerns are difficult to respond to directly because they are linked only
indirectly to specific actions taken by farmers.
Uncertainty for agribusiness also stems from the proliferation of townships in
Pennsylvania making it difficult to be aware of and responsive to a myriad of different
local provisions. The extent to which someone feels uncertain about a stimulus
influences their perceptions of the risk involved with that situation and the amount of
control they have over that situation. Thus, the more uncertainty an individual
perceives about their health, the environment, and/or the regulations and their
enforcement, the more likely they are to perceive that there are substantial risks
associated with that situation while also feeling they have little control over it. This
decreased sense of control may well stimulate conflict behavior. This discussion is
summarized graphically in Figure 3

Stimulus--* Uncertainty

+

DecreasedSense of Control

0 Conflict

Figure 3

B. Perceptionsof Risk
Perception of risk refers to one's view of the danger involved in a given
situation. That means people view risk as either the likelihood that something will
happen or how bad it will be if something does or does not happen. Some people
believe that meeting the standards prescribed for a Nutrient Management Plan rules
out the possibility that an ILO could pose any health or environmental threats to a
community. For them, there is no risk associated with the siting and running of ILOs.
For others who are concerned about potential long-term health problems from
concentrated odors associated with ILOs, perceptions of risk could be very high.
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Project data suggest that perceptions of risk are expressed in forecasts and affective
reactions. Forecasts include expressions of concern about regulations on farmers, the
environment, economics, and rights. Affective reactions included concerns about
community cohesion and threats to oneself and one's family.
Perceptions of risk vary across stakeholders. For example, one government
stakeholder believes that perceptions of risk to the environment are high and
widespread across a variety of stakeholders. According to this stakeholder, groups
who think the laws are flawed take every opportunity to promote that point of view
and feed off each other.
Stakeholders also expressed affective concerns about how the conflict
fractures communities, about health risks and about threats to oneself in the form of
verbal abuse. One stakeholder clearly expressed affective concerns about community
cohesion. By indicating the more farming background that you have, the more likely
you are to disagree with the people who are opposed to CAFOs generally. Another
stakeholder expressed a unique concern about his/her own and his/her family's health.
That person was concerned that pigs' strong immune system and genetic similarity to
humans makes CAFOs a major health risk. That stakeholder believes the integrators
cannot guarantee that the pigs'diseases won't become ours because of the genetic link.
That is why putting pigs in this situation is dangerous. Somewhat surprisingly, even
expert stakeholders expressed concerns about risk to themselves, including, their
personal safety.
The greater stakeholders' perceptions of risk, the more likely they will feel a
threat to their own safety and will want to exert some control over the situation to
alleviate or ameliorate the potential for harm. On the other hand, stakeholders with
low perceptions of risk will likely experience considerable control and have no need
to initiate conflict. These relationships are reflected in Figure 4.
Stimulus

1* Risk Perception

1 Sense of Control

1 Conflict

Figure 4
Additionally, the perception of risk that a group or individual holds may also
be influenced by their perceptions of control. This means that the greater the
perception of control a group or individual holds, the lower they perceive the risk to
be. For example, someone who thinks they can control the amount of manure run-off
that will enter a stream may believe that they are providing a facility that poses
virtually no risk to a community. Others, who believe they have no influence on the
legal procedures for siting an ILO, may fear that older people in their community are
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exposed to an inordinate amount of risk. This relationship is represented via a dashed
feedback loop in Figure 4.
Finally, stakeholders' perceptions of risk and their perceptions of control are
both likely to influence their conflict behavior. The greater the degree of risk a
stakeholder perceives, the more likely they will become engaged in the conflict.
However, their perception of control may temper or influence the choice of process or
venue they select. That is, someone who perceives they are placed at a high risk but
also believes they have a great deal of control over the legal or legislative process,
may opt for traditional approaches to solving conflict such as political processes or the
courts. We refer to these as prescribed venues. By prescribed venue we mean the
method prescribed in existing laws for getting information or registering complaints or
the use of traditional processes like working through the legislative process. On the
other hand, a stakeholder who believes they have very little political or legal power
and who perceives that they are in great risk may be more inclined to engage in
alternative conflict behavior (e.g., mobilization behavior such as protests or rallying a
community to fight the siting of an ILO.) See Figure 5.

Stimulus---*High Risk Perception -+-High Sense of Control "---ConflictBehavior
in Prescribed Venue
Stimulus--*High Risk Perception -- *Low Sense of Control -- *Conflict Behavior
in Alternative Venue

Figure 5

C.

Perceptionsof Fairness

An individual's perception of the fairness of a specific law or regulation can
also influence their perception of their ability to control the outcome of disputes that
involve the unfair law or regulation.105 After evaluating one's perception of the
fairness of laws or regulations, people generally translate their evaluation into a
perception of their ability to control the outcome of a dispute in which the law or
regulation is involved. To the extent a person perceives a law as unfair and believes
that they have little ability to change it, they are more likely to initiate conflict. The
perceptions of unfairness and of having little control over the outcome of a dispute
increase the chance of conflict when a law or regulation perceived to be unfair is

105.
See generally Daniel W. Shurnan & Jean A. Hamilton, Jury Service - ItMay Change Your
Mind: Perceptionsof Fairnessof Jurors and Nonjurors, 49 SMU L. REv. 449, 452 (1992) (setting forth
the general principle that perceptions of fairness are independently affected by personal experiences).
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applied. Conversely, the perception of a law or regulation as fair increases the
perception of a person's control over the situation and reduces the likelihood of
conflict initiation. Below we illustrate how different stakeholders link their sense of
fairness to the degree of control they believe they can exercise and the conflict
behavior they elect to take.
Comments from community members often reflect their sense of unfairness
based on their perceived lack of control over the changes that are occurring in their
communities. Pre-emption, in particular, leads community members to feel they have
lost their ability to participate in shaping an outcome. Other community members see
the process of enacting Act 6 as lacking integrity, and, therefore, they conclude that
the Act itself is unfair. As noted earlier, others expressed concerns about how
regulations are enforced. One interviewee complains that different procedures are
used in different cases.
To others that we interviewed, particularly those aligned with farmers, their
perception of control is linked to frustration felt when they view others ignoring laws
that they believe to be fair. Once Act 6 was passed, they saw its provisions as clear
and believe that townships are now trying to change the "rules of the game."
Therefore, our data suggests that a person's perception of the fairness of laws and
regulations is influenced by their degree of dissatisfaction with law and regulation.
Perceptions of fairness of law and regulation result from:
1. Disagreement with or objection to substantive provisions of law;
2. Perceived lack of influence in the law-making process; and/or
3. Dissatisfaction with how the laws are enforced.
Schematically, these relationships are reflected in Figure 6.

Perceptions of Fairness ---

Perceptions of Control --- + Conflict Behavior

Figure 6

D.

Threats to Social Identity

Stimuli may also pose a direct threat to the social identity of stakeholders.
Social identity refers to that part of an individual's sense of self that comes from their
affiliation with particular groups: community member, activist, farmer, farm advocate,
environmentalist, etc. These group memberships can be based on categories (like
ethnicity or gender), ascribed by others (through stereotyping), or can be adopted by
choice.
People involved in the conflict see themselves, and are seen by others, as
members of groups. In disputes over ILOs salient social identities include:
community member, activist, farmer, farm advocate, environmentalist, etc. These
social identities are important because group membership conveys both a sense of
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belonging for members, as well as an assumption that group members have some set
of shared attributes. As a social identity becomes salient for a group member, it
becomes more important to their overall sense of self. Threats or challenges to this
social identity feel like threats to one's person.
Social identities in our interviews influenced conflict in several ways.
Parties' perceptions about their level of influence and control are connected to the
salience of particular social identities. For some groups, the social identity is a source
of structure and security. It reinforces group members' sense of belonging, their
confidence in their voice, and thus their perception that they will be successful in
using prescribed processes to achieve their goal.
In other instances however, if one's salient social identity is threatened by a
stimulus, this challenges the group member's sense of security and can lead to a
reduced perception of control. The violation of the identity often reinforces the group
members' perceptions that he/she cannot expect to be successful in using a prescribed
venue and thus gives energy to attempts to be heard in an alternative venue.
Alternative venues (e.g., protest, new ordinances, community organizations,
challenges to credibility of prescribed processes, etc.) can enhance the person's
perceived ability to control the outcome of a dispute or offset the perceived unfairness
of the law or regulation.
Threats or violations of a group identity came from both outside and within
groups and impact conflict behavior in different ways. In cases where a salient social
identity is violated or challenged by someone outside the group, the external challenge
often serves to mobilize group members. The violation of the identity also reinforces
group members' perceptions that they cannot expect to be successful in using a
prescribed venue and gives energy to their attempts to be heard in an alternative one.
One salient social identity expressed by community members is that of an
American citizen living in a democracy. When their expectations of the meaning of
this identity are violated, they feel called to act. In some instances however, the
external violation leads people to decide to stop participating in any process. Rather
than mobilizing groups, it leads to immobilization.
For example, when one
stakeholder's espoused identity as a community supporter was challenged, he now
questions whether the effort needed to maintain a relationship with the community is
worth the cost.
Finally, there are examples of social identities that are challenged or
threatened by other members of the same group during an internal conflict about the
nature of the group's identity. These threats can lead to immobilization as well.
These internal threats happen in different ways. In some cases, the social
identity of the group is challenged because members do not share the same views nor
do they have shared goals in the conflict. In our data, such splits are evident within
government agencies, communities, and among farmers. For farmers, this split often
occurs between persons who see themselves as members of the community and others
who suddenly view them as the enemy. Several interviewees offered observations on
this identity issue.
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"Spoilers," group members who are seen by other members of the group as
acting in ways that do not reflect the values and norms of the group, can also
challenge a group's identity. In summary, threats to social identity are related to
conflict behavior in the way depicted in Figure 7.

Stimulus

*

External or Internal
10 Perception of
Threat to Social Identify
Loss of Control

Conflict Behavior:
Choice of Venue
(Prescribed or Alternative)
Degree of Mobilization
(Increase or Immobilization
Figure 7
E.

Perceptionsof Trust

Another cognitive factor interacting with perceptions of control is trust.
Perceptions of trust, or more accurately the lack of trust, have a significant impact on
the level of influence and control parties feel they have and, in turn, on the venue they
are willing to use to influence the conflict process. Trust issues emerged as an
important part of the conflict process in many of the conversations we had with
people. Trust issues existed within groups or agencies, among community members,
between integrators and other parties in the conflict and between citizens and the
government.
In this section, we focus on trust issues that interact with social identities.
When individuals categorize both themselves and others as members of particular
groups, they develop expectations about how members of those groups should behave.
For example, when someone identifies himself as "citizen" and others as
"representatives," this categorization creates a set of expectations for how "citizens"
should be treated and how "representatives" should behave. When their own
expectations are not met, stakeholders, rightly or wrongly, often experience a breach
of trust.
The lack of trust in government officials was a strong theme in our interviews.
Citizens come into these conflicts with a specific set of expectations for their elected
government officials. These expectations include a set of "shoulds." The state should
protect citizen interests, help citizens and be responsive to citizen concerns, follow the
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procedures and guidelines it sets for itself, and be honest in its dealings with citizens.
When these expectations are not met, group members feel a sense of violation
regarding who they are because these expectations are associated with their sense of
their social identity. As trust declines, these groups mobilize to make their voices
heard, often using alternative venue choices.
Some citizens' trust decreases as they perceive government legislators or
agency officials aligning themselves with one interest group rather than protecting and
responding to the interests and concerns of all citizens. Citizens distrust government
when they perceive government officials taking sides, and/or acting as advocates and
supporters of intensive livestock operations when they believe the job of government
representatives should be to act as advocates for all citizens.
On the other hand, farmers and agribusiness representatives are also
distrustful when they perceive government officials are exceeding their authority by
supporting community concerns over the interests of farmers. When farmers
satisfactorily complete the tasks required by existing regulations, these stakeholders
believe a permit should be granted. These stakeholders believe when local townships
pass ordinances that go beyond Act 6, they are clearly illegal.
Distrust also increases when groups believe that the system is not doing what
it promised to do. Whether it is a perceived lack of will, resources, or adequate
regulations, groups feel they cannot trust government officials to do their job.
Finally, groups express distrust of the government when they perceive agency
officials and elected representatives as being dishonest. One stakeholder explained
how frustrating it is when people that "are complaining of real health problems or
perceived changes" are called liars and told that their complaints "must be their
imagination," even when the agencies or the agribusiness haven't actually conducted
studies on the issues yet themselves.
When distrust occurs among one or more stakeholder groups, this leads to
violated expectations and a decreased sense of control. As we have noted above, this
decreased sense of control fuels conflict behavior, particularly mobilization and use of
alternative venues. These relationships are depicted in Figure 8 and described further
in the next section.
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Low Trust

Stimulus

Perception of
Social Identity -

Control

10

Conflict Behavior

(Violated Expectations)
Alternative Venue Choice
Increased Mobilization
Figure 8

F. Perceptionsof Controland Choice of Venue
Over time, as people respond to a particular stimuli, they come to have a
sense about how much control and influence they have in the conflict. One of the
repeated themes was the desire by parties on all sides of the issue to be heard, and to
have a voice in making decisions regarding ILOs, particularly if there is a conflict.
Environmentalists, agribusiness representatives, local farmers, government officials
and community members all want to have their interests, .needs and concerns taken
into consideration as decisions are made. Some stakeholders perceive that they have
little voice. As noted earlier, for some local residents the issue of pre-emption, in
particular, epitomizes the loss of their ability to participate in shaping an outcome.
As parties get involved in a conflict, they assess their ability to have
influence. This assessment affects the choices they make about how to act in the
conflict and the most viable venue in which to pursue their goals (see D in Figure 2).
If they feel they have a voice, then they are more likely to use a prescribed or official
venue for influencing what happens in the conflict (NMP, permitting, etc.)
People prefer to engage in decision-making processes that they perceive will
be procedurally fair. That is, one in which they will have an opportunity to play a role
in the decision-making process, and to have voice and influence over the outcome of
the process. Thus, the venue that a stakeholder chooses will reflect these factors,
whereas individuals who perceive that they lack voice in the decision making process
or who seek to offset perceived unfairness in the laws and regulations, will seek
alternative venues to express their viewpoint.
Some activist groups express related concerns about voice. These groups are
concerned that they do not have the resources, the time or the personal power to

2002]

Community Conflicts Over Intensive Livestock Operations

participate in negotiations with other stakeholders and, as a consequence, feel that the
deck is stacked against them.
Often in conflicts over ILOs the decision-making venues are prescribed (e.g.,
conservation districts decide on the suitability of a nutrient management plan). If the
prescribed venue is perceived negatively, however, the venue itself exacerbates the
conflict. As with challenges to a person's social identity, when negative perceptions
of fairness and a perceived inability to influence an outcome exist, individuals and
groups seek out alternative venues where the likelihood of being heard is increased.
Therefore, we conclude that a person's perception of their ability to be heard
and to influence the outcome of a dispute is reflected in their preferred choice of
venue. Venues that enhance a person's ability to control the outcome of the dispute,
or which are believed to offset perceived lack of control, will be favored.
Additionally, a person's perceptions of his or her individual or group ability to
influence the outcome of disputes affects the person's willingness to become involved
in the resolution of disputes.
Persons who perceive a law or regulation to be fair and who perceive they
have individual or group power to control the outcome of disputes involving the
application of the law or regulation will mobilize as individuals or in groups in order
to exercise greater influence. If, however, a person perceives a law or regulation to be
unfair, and that he or she has little control over the outcome of a dispute, he or she
will be less likely to mobilize. In this case, immobilization may be manifested in
decisions or actions to withdraw from any situations that could lead to conflict or the
conflict, itself. This is depicted in Figure 9.

Perception of Control

Conflict Behavior:

L_

Choice of Venue
(alternative or prescribed)
Degree of Mobilization
(increase or immobilization)

Figure 9
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CONCLUSION

Concluding Comments on the Model

In this model we reflect how each of the five cognitive/affective reactions can
affect stakeholders' perception of control. These, in turn, influence the choice of
venue and the degree of mobilization that the conflict takes.
This section has reviewed the many social forces that generate conflicts over
ILOs and cause these conflicts to intensify. These conflicts can exact a tremendous
emotional, social and economic toll on those involved. Costs and expenses for all
parties can quickly escalate and delay adds to these costs. At its worst, the situation
pits competing community values against each other and the community itself is no
longer clear as to where it stands. These conflicts have had wrenching effects on
individuals, as well as on the social fabric of many communities. While such conflicts
likely cannot be totally avoided, they can be addressed in more constructive fashion
than they have been in the past.
B.

Conclusionsand Unresolved Questions

Based on this analysis, the project team concludes that an individual or
group's perception of its ability to control a situation is the most important predictor
of conflict behavior. When stakeholders experience considerable uncertainty or risk,
feel threatened, believe they have little voice, or mistrust other stakeholders,
stakeholder perceptions of control over the situation decreases. If perceptions of
control decrease, individuals and groups seek out alternative means of asserting some
degree of control over the situation, and the potential for conflict rises.
Given the importance of perceptions, what factors or elements influence their
development? Access to scientific information about a process or activity involved in
a dispute is a crucial element in the development of individual and group perceptions.
Accuracy and credibility of this information are key considerations. Are some sources
of information viewed to be more credible, or conversely less credible, than others?
The advent of the World Wide Web has increased everyone's access to
information, but what is the value of the information that the web has made available
to us? Is anyone asking whether the information obtained is worth the time and effort
to find and download it? Is it just some slanted, partisan ramblings of interest groups
and individuals who seek to persuade others to their point of view without concern for
what it costs to achieve that result? Is anyone evaluating the accuracy of what the web
provides? Does anyone care if the information is accurate? While this may be an
important issue, it also raises the question whether the accuracy of information
obtained from other sources is any more or less credible than that obtained on the
Internet.
A second significant conclusion is the importance that the perception of
fairness in a process is a fertile ground for conflict. These research results show that
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people often perceive the fairness of a process on the basis of how it was determined.
If a person played a role in developing the process, that person views it to be fairer
than one where he was excluded from the development process. How could a process
be viewed as fair if the contribution of some groups was not sought or actively
avoided?
What opportunities are there for government to influence public
perceptions regarding fairness? Are decision makers willing to open decision-making
processes to allow for broader public input and participation? Are decision makers
willing to give up a degree of power and control over the process and share it with
others? In this context, one insight from the research is that the average person's
perception regarding the impact depends upon their participation in the decisionmaking process. Seemingly, most people believe they have greater influence over the
outcome than decision-makers will admit. To remedy this, should government dispel
the public's ill-conceived notion, or should government correct the process to allow
the public's role to achieve what they perceive it to be?
Preemption is a valuable example of this situation. In the eyes of lawmakers,
preempting authority of local governments to address issues that have been addressed
at the state or federal level is a recognized principle. While the authority of
government to preempt is clear, the results of the interviews establish that there is
confusion in the minds of people regarding why preemption could or should be used
in a given situation, and the impact that preemption will have on those affected by it.
How will people in local communities benefit when their ability to control sensitive
land uses is removed? Perceptions of fairness are negatively influenced when people
perceive that the process that led to adopting the measure did not seek input from all
stakeholder groups, or severely discounted the views of one or more groups while
favoring others. How should government officials, wielding the power to preempt,
exercise it? Do political considerations outweigh all other considerations?
Enforcement of laws and regulations is a third example of significant results
from this research. Interestingly, both parties recognize that only strict enforcement
of the existing laws and regulations will appease their interests. To those who favor
existing laws and regulations, anything less than full enforcement is viewed as the loss
of a benefit that should be provided. To those who do not favor existing rules,
anything less than full enforcement allows offenders to reap a benefit they were not
intended to receive. Government can take no action that is less than full enforcement
without risking the alienation of some significant group of people.
A fourth significant conclusion is that groups who conclude they have the
ability to affect the conflict in a way that advances their interests are more likely to
use the established methods to apply the law or resolve a dispute. Stakeholders who
approve of the existing regulations are more likely to trust the processes for
implementing them. Conversely, those stakeholders who do not favor existing
regulations perceive they have little ability to advance their interests through the
established methods and will be forced to choose an alternative, which restores a
sense of control over their situation. Given this set of concerns, what action can or
should government take to change these perceptions?
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Based on these conclusions, future actions taken by government must: (1)
reduce risk and uncertainty regarding a wide variety of issues associated with
intensive livestock operations, (2) acknowledge and respect identity while provide a
balanced voice, (3) be perceived as fair by all, (4) increase trust among the
stakeholders, (5) enhance all stakeholders' perceptions of control and, (6) reduce
tensions among the parties. The clear challenge to policy-makers is to develop a
process that is more supportive than it is disruptive. Actions taken today will have
significant impacts tomorrow.

